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Despite possessing statutory authority to regulate at least some
contributing causes of climate change, environmental regulators in the
United States have recently found themselves tied up in political gridlock.
In response, advocates are turning from the regulatory track to a common
law liability track, bringing public nuisance suits against fossil fuel
producers and electric utilities. However, most of these public nuisance suits
have met a common fate: they have been held to be displaced by the
comprehensive regulatory framework for controlling greenhouse gas
emissions contained in the Clean Air Act. As long as there is even the
possibility of regulatory action from EPA, suits alleging violations of the
federal common law of public nuisance will be dismissed. The result is that
neither road to serious climate policy is passable in the current environment.
This Article points to a gap-filling approach that has yet to be pursued by
climate change advocates. Even if EPA will not or cannot regulate and
nuisance suits against electric power and transportation sector defendants
are barred, one set of contributors to climate change is still susceptible to
suit. The animal agricultural industry is responsible for a surprising
amount of greenhouse gas emissions—around 18 percent of global emissions
and by some estimates even more than all transportation sources combined.
Unlike with emissions of greenhouse gases from tailpipes or smokestacks,
there is no plausible argument that Congress has ever developed a statutory
framework that speaks directly to the problem of animal agriculture’s
contributions to climate change. While this means regulators lack authority
to address the problem, it also means that courts should be able to maneuver
around the displacement barriers to hear a properly pled federal common law
of nuisance action against offending meat producers. I argue that such a
suit would be a worthwhile enterprise not only because it stands a reasonable
chance of surmounting the displacement barrier to climatic nuisance suits,
but also because it would put pressure on policymakers and industry to curb
emissions and would bring public scrutiny to the inefficiencies and
externalities of animal agriculture.
INTRODUCTION
Climate change is an existential threat to our way of life. 1
Policymakers around the globe have been scrambling for several

1. See Coral Davenport, Major Climate Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis as Early as 2040,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/climate/ipcc-climatereport-2040.html [https://perma.cc/8BRP-MNBW] (reporting on a report by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change showing that at the current pace of emissions,
the “atmosphere will warm up by as much as 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit (1.5 degrees Celsius)
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decades now to find ways to respond to the threat. 2 It is clear,
however, that these regulatory efforts are not moving fast enough
to prevent some of the serious impacts of climate change. 3 In the
United States, the situation is particularly dire, as the Trump
Administration has reversed most of the significant Obama-era
climate initiatives, setting the timetable for action back by years. 4
While the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) gives the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) authority to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from certain sources, 5 the agency appears uninterested in
using that authority while President Trump holds office.
Compounding the problem is that much climate change
litigation—which could potentially serve as a parallel or a substitute
track to the regulatory track—has been stymied by the false hope
that U.S. regulators would use their authority to develop a
comprehensive regulatory solution. For decades before the advent
of modern statutory environmental policy, environmental problems
were addressed in federal court in private nuisance suits. 6 When
disputes crossed state lines, federal courts stood at the ready to
impose liability under the federal common law of public nuisance.
Even though global climate change presents unique challenges and
complexities compared to ordinary environmental problems, it is
plausible to think that the federal common law of nuisance might
have some role to play, particularly when other forms of regulation
are unavailable. Indeed, litigants have been bringing climate

above preindustrial levels by 2040, inundating coastlines and intensifying droughts and
poverty”).
2. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Climate Change, 2009–2016, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 231 (2018).
3. See DAVID WALLACE-WELLS, THE UNINHABITABLE EARTH: LIFE AFTER WARMING ch. 1
(2019) (engagingly summarizing the likely scenarios for warming over the next decades);
Cary Coglianese, Pledging, Populism, and the Paris Agreement: The Paradox of a Management-Based
Approach to Global Governance, 34 MD. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author)
(showing that there are critical gaps in the Paris Climate Accord that fail to ensure sufficient
mitigation efforts).
4. See Joseph E. Aldy, Real World Headwinds for Trump Climate Change Policy, 73 BULL.
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 376 (2017).
5. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that carbon dioxide is a
pollutant under the Clean Air Act).
6. See Mark P. Nevitt & Robert V. Percival, Could Official Climate Denial Revive the Common
Law as a Regulatory Backstop?, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 441, 447–62 (2018) (chronicling in detail
the history of the federal courts’ use of the common law of public nuisance to address
interstate environmental problems); see also infra Part I.B.
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nuisance suits in the hopes that they might spur further action,
governmental and private. 7
Yet courts have so far punted in the most important of these
cases. 8 In the 2011 case American Electric Power v. Connecticut, the
Supreme Court seemed to eliminate nuisance liability for climatechanging emissions. 9 According to the Court, the CAA displaced
the federal common law of public nuisance when it came to carbon
dioxide (“CO2”) emissions from electric utilities, leaving the EPA
with exclusive authority to regulate in this space. 10 In the years
following this holding, EPA appeared to be making the regulatory
progress that the Supreme Court expected. 11 However, political
changes have halted this progress, leaving a policy vacuum. 12 As
long as the Court’s decision in American Electric Power stands and

7. See Albert C. Lin & Michael Burger, State Public Nuisance Claims and Climate Change
Adaptation, 36 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 49 (2018) (discussing much of the current nuisance
litigation landscape).
8. In saying this, I do not mean do diminish the importance of the often incrementalist
litigation strategies being employed around the country. See Hari M. Osofky & Jacqueline
Peel, The Role of Litigation in Multilevel Climate Change Governance: Possibilities for a Lower
Carbon Future?, 30 ENVTL. & PLANNING L.J. 303, 307 (2013) (“The rulings issued by courts in
climate change cases, across various jurisdictions and at different levels of governance (subnational, national, and international) can thus be seen to play an important role in
articulating forms of ‘transnational climate change regulation.’”). My point is only that
federal law can be more comprehensive in its impacts, and therefore more likely to be
accepted by courts as a useful form of policymaking in the complex, interjurisdictional
domain of climate change policy.
9. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). Technically, displacement
does not apply to state public nuisance law, which has led litigants in a recent wave of
nuisance actions to predominantly plead state nuisance causes of action. See Lin & Burger,
supra note 7 (arguing that state public nuisance claims may prove influential in ongoing
litigation). Importantly, the early signs suggest problems with this route around the
displacement barrier. First, even though displacement does not apply, preemption might.
Id. Second, Judge Alsup’s bellwether decision in City of Oakland construed the state causes of
action as federal causes of action, noting that “a patchwork of fifty different answers to the
same fundamental global issue would be unworkable.” Order Denying Motions to Remand,
People of the State of California v. BP p.l.c., No. C 17-06011 WHA, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27,
2018), https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/california/candce/3:2017cv06011/
318403/134/0.pdf?ts=1519809712 [https://perma.cc/VBK9-957T]. It remains to be seen
whether state public nuisance claims against fossil fuel companies and utilities will fare better
on appeal.
10. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424 (“We hold that the Clean Air Act and the EPA
actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of carbondioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”).
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. See infra Part I.C.
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regulators remain unwilling or unable to act, any serious national
response to climate change would appear to be a non-starter. 13
This Article points to a gap-filling approach that, so far, has been
overlooked by climate change advocates who have focused on the
energy and transportation sectors. Even if EPA currently will not
regulate the fossil fuel sources of emissions, and even if federal
nuisance suits against electric power and transportation sector
defendants are displaced, the CAA leaves one major contributing
industry unregulated. The agriculture industry is responsible for a
surprising amount of greenhouse gas emissions. At the global
level, studies show that the industry is responsible for a third of
global emissions. 14 In the United States, the numbers are slightly
lower, but still stunning. Accepting even the lowest-end estimate of
9 percent of U.S. emissions would mean that the industry produces
enough to match the emissions from 120 million automobiles. 15
Animal agriculture contributes the lion’s share of these agricultural
emissions—some 18 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions
come from livestock production. 16 Beef production in the United
States alone accounts for 3.3 percent of domestic greenhouse gas
emissions—not just agricultural emissions, but all emissions. 17
13. It bears noting that the federal government’s inaction and delay could be limited by
the litigation in Juliana v. United States over whether the government’s failure to mitigate
climate change violates the constitutional rights of minors and the duty of the government to
protect its sovereign land. See David Wallace-Wells, What if the Courts Could Save the Climate?,
N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 29, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/
julianna-v-united-states-how-courts-could-save-the-climate.html
[https://perma.cc/8FJ9S4FL]. However, the ultimate outcome of that litigation is anything but certain at this point,
and the latest orders have further delayed the litigation. See Sophie Yeo, Will the Juliana
Climate Case Ever Go to Court?, PAC. STANDARD (Nov. 27, 2018), https://psmag.com/
environment/will-the-juliana-youth-climate-case-ever-go-to-court [https://perma.cc/X7KZG7MK].
14. See, e.g., Sonja J. Vermeulen et al., Climate Change and Food Systems, 37 ANN. REV. ENV’T
& RESOURCES 195, 198 (2012).
15. See Peter H. Lehner & Nathan A. Rosenberg, Agriculture, in LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP
DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 772, 774 (Michael Gerrard & John C. Dernbach
eds., 2019) (citing Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions
[https://perma.cc/HHG6-SSG8] (last visited Mar. 2, 2019)).
16. See, e.g., ALEXANDER N. HRISTOV ET AL., U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., MITIGATION OF
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION (Pierre J. Gerber et al. eds., 2013),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3288e/i3288e.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BZV-77D9]; How
Meat Contributes to Global Warming, SCI. AM., https://www.scientificamerican.com/slideshow/
the-greenhouse-hamburger/ [https://perma.cc/BB2K-YTEZ] (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
17. Jan Suszkiw, Study Clarifies U.S. Beef’s Resource Use and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.ars.usda.gov/news-events/news/researchnews/2019/study-clarifies-us-beefs-resource-use-and-greenhouse-gas-emissions/
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Some of the industry’s contributions come from direct emissions of
greenhouse gases—carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide—
from the animals and their waste. 18 But changes in land use,
transportation of materials, and production of feed for animal
consumption are also part of the overall footprint of meat. 19
Indeed, when these factors are all considered, it becomes apparent
that producing meat is among the least efficient uses of natural
resources. For example, it takes 20 calories of grain to produce just
one calorie of beef, and when all of the inputs are added up, the
carbon footprint of a single kilogram of beef protein is an
astonishing 1,000 kilograms of CO2 equivalent. 20 The industry also
diminishes the world’s resilience in the face of climate change:
that same kilogram of beef protein will have used about 15,000
liters of water compared to just 1,250 liters of water for the same
amount of corn or wheat. 21 Considering that global meat
consumption will double by 2050, 22 agriculture, and in particular
animal agriculture, is fertile ground for curbing climate change,
and the failure to adequately address it could mute gains made in
other areas.
Despite its significant impact, animal agriculture is in effect
exempt from the suite of environmental statutes that collectively
demarcate the field of environmental law in the United States. 23
This lack of statutory attention would seem to be a major problem,
but the Supreme Court’s approach to the displacement of the
federal common law of nuisance is promising for future climate
change litigants. Unlike with emissions of greenhouse gases from
[https://perma.cc/H7KV-6ELG]. See also C. Alan Rotz, Senorpe Asem-Hiabele, Sara Place &
Greg Thomas, Environmental Footprints of Beef Cattle Production in the United States, 169 AGRIC.
SYS. 1, 1 (2019).
18. Global Livestock Environmental Assessment Model (GLEAM), U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG.,
http://www.fao.org/gleam/results/en/ [https://perma.cc/3EZ7-PRL2] (last visited Feb. 27,
2019) (describing emissions from enteric fermentation in the digestion of feed and
emissions from manure management practices).
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. J.L.P., Meat and Greens: How Bad for the Planet Is Eating Meat?, ECONOMIST
(Dec. 31, 2013), https://www.economist.com/feast-and-famine/2013/12/31/meat-andgreens [https://perma.cc/63NV-757L].
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 263
(2000). But see J. Nicholas Hoover, Can’t You Smell That Smell? Clean Air Act Fixes for Factory
Farm Air Pollution, 6 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 1 (2013) (arguing that the CAA could apply
to a special category of animal farm called a Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation
(“CAFO”) and support emission-based regulation of the industry).

2019]

Animal Agriculture Liability for Climatic Nuisance

305

tailpipes or smokestacks, there is no plausible argument that
Congress has ever developed a statutory framework that speaks
directly to the problem of animal agriculture’s contributions to
climate change. Displacement should therefore not be a barrier to
courts hearing a properly pled federal common law of public
nuisance claim against offending meatpackers who pass the
environmental harms that they create on to a future public.
This Article lays out the case for using the federal common law of
public nuisance to address animal agriculture’s contribution to
climate change. Part I explains why this move is necessary,
recounting the failures of regulators, the turn to climate change
litigation, and the barriers to climate change litigation created by
the Supreme Court’s endorsement of a preference for regulatory
solutions where Congress has directly spoken to a problem. Part II
then makes the legal case that animal agriculture’s contribution to
climate change has not been directly addressed by Congress, and
therefore the displacement analysis in American Electric Power would
not control.
In Part III, I explain why overcoming the
displacement barrier would likely be sufficient for such a climate
nuisance suit to make a substantial impact.
I. THE REGULATORY GAP
Climate change is an extraordinarily complex market failure—a
“super wicked problem,” as Richard Lazarus terms it.” 24 Many
economists, environmental scholars, and even judges tend to prefer
a regulatory strategy to a common law strategy. 25 Of course, these
categories—purely regulatory and purely common law—tend to
blur in the real world of governance. 26 Moreover, action in one
category can be part of a positive feedback loop that spurs action in

24. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009).
25. See generally REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND
LAW (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2010); Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change
Litigation Through the Lens of a Hypothetical Lawsuit, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 701 (2008); Elizabeth
Fisher, Climate Change Litigation, Obsession and Expertise: Reflecting on the Scholarly Response to
Massachusetts v. EPA, 35 LAW & POL’Y 236 (2013).
26. Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Litigation’s Regulatory Pathways and the
Administrative State: Lessons from U.S. and Australian Climate Change Governance, 25 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 213 (2013) (describing a broad “socio-legal tradition that treats a wide
range of formal and informal action by diverse actors as regulatory and as part of an overall
governance process”).
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the other category. 27 Nevertheless, we can think of progress on
climate change as taking either a regulatory track or a common law
track. This Part chronicles the ascendance of the regulatory track
over the common law track in the United States and the growing
political barriers to regulation that make this imbalance
concerning.
A. Massachusetts v. EPA and the Regulatory Track
Initially, climate change litigation focusing on regulatory inaction
seemed to hold out the possibility that regulators would ultimately
take the reins. In Massachusetts v. EPA, a coalition of states, cities,
and environmental groups successfully sued EPA after the agency
denied a rulemaking petition urging the agency to undertake
regulation of carbon dioxide emissions from mobile sources. 28 In
denying the petition, EPA had argued that it did not have the
regulatory authority to do what the petitioners were asking, and
that, even if it did, it would not opt to exercise that regulatory
authority in light of other considerations, including the possibility
of Congress taking on the task of passing targeted legislation. 29
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the notion that carbon
dioxide did not qualify as an air pollutant under the CAA, holding
that EPA did in fact have authority to use the CAA to address
carbon dioxide emissions from mobile sources. 30 Further, the
Court rejected EPA’s prudential reasons for inaction as arbitrary
and capricious because they were too untethered to the criteria
designated as relevant under the statute. 31
With the Supreme Court’s decision, EPA had little choice but to
make an endangerment finding—a decision that carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases were not only potential air pollutants
under the CAA, but that they also endanger public health and
welfare by contributing to global climate change. 32 EPA made that

27. See infra Part III.B.
28. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
29. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, Notice of Denial of
Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,928–31 (Sept. 8, 2003).
30. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528–32.
31. Id. at 532, 535.
32. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 66 (arguing that the Court’s decision made it “virtually unavoidable”
for EPA to decline to regulate).
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finding with respect to mobile sources in 2009,33 paving the way for
rules regulating emission standards for light-duty vehicles and
heavy-duty vehicles. 34 Moreover, after promulgating the light-duty
automobile standards, EPA made the finding that regulating those
sources “set off a chain reaction” culminating in a duty to regulate
emissions from stationary sources under other programs in the
CAA. 35 In the so-called “Triggering Rule,” EPA stated that the
regulation of vehicle greenhouse gas emissions required it to seek
pre-construction permits for any major stationary source in an
attainment area under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
(“PSD”) program, 36 and also required it to seek operating permits
for existing sources under the Title V program. 37
One obstacle remained, however; by statute, the PSD and Title V
programs apply when sources emit pollutants in excess of fairly low
statutory thresholds. Greenhouse gases are emitted on a scale that
is ill-suited to this framework, with the result that millions of
sources would have suddenly been required to seek permits. 38
EPA’s solution was to promulgate a rule, known as the “Tailoring
Rule,” that imposed different thresholds that were more
appropriate to the scale of industrial greenhouse gas emissions. 39
In effect, the new requirements under the PSD and Title V

33. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). Getting to that
point was not easy, however. During the George W. Bush administration, high-level
executive officials stunted EPA’s early proposals. For a brief recap of these temporary, and
ultimately unsuccessful, attempts to stall the response to Massachusetts v. EPA, see Lisa
Heinzerling, Climate Change at EPA, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2012).
34. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010); Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles,
76 Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011).
35. Cecilia Segal et al., Climate Regulation Under the Clean Air Act in the Wake of Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2015). Notably, EPA maintained
that it was not required to issue National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) for
carbon dioxide, which therefore triggered no duty for states to develop implementation
plans to reduce carbon dioxide. As I will discuss later, this gap may be another reason that
the CAA does not displace the common law of public nuisance when it comes to greenhouse
gases.
36. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered
by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010).
37. Id.
38. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule,
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule].
39. Id.
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programs would only apply to significant contributors of
greenhouse gas emissions.
In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, the Supreme Court nixed
this effort to limit the scope of the new requirements. 40 According
to the Court, the plain language of the statute—specifically, the
numerical thresholds—could not be effectively amended by
regulations. 41 EPA would have to regulate all sources, no matter
how minute their contributions, or not regulate at all. In light of
the purported absurdity of regulating all sources, the Court
narrowly construed the triggering language relied on by the
Triggering Rule, vacating EPA’s conclusion that it had to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources in the first
place. 42
Undeterred, EPA found a new path within the CAA to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions. Responding in part to President
Obama’s increasing emphasis on climate action, 43 EPA in 2015
promulgated CO2 emission guidelines for existing electric
generating units. 44 Colloquially known as the “Clean Power Plan,”
these new regulations on existing power plants aimed to fill a longstanding gap in the CAA’s coverage by bringing grandfathered
existing plants into the regulatory fold. 45 At the same time, EPA
imposed new source performance standards (“NSPS”) on new and
modified power plants. 46 Together, the two rules were predicted to
lead to declines of electric power sector emissions to 32 percent of
2005 levels by 2030. 47
40. Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
41. Id.
42. Id. To be clear, the Court did uphold EPA’s development of “best available control
technology” standards for greenhouse gas emissions for so-called “anyway sources”—i.e.,
those sources that would have been required to comply with the PSD and Title V permitting
programs because of emission of more conventional “air pollutants.” Id. at 334.
43. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN
(2013),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27s
climateactionplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG7Q-FZDC] (reaffirming a commitment to
reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2050).
44. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015).
45. See RICHARD L. REVESZ & JACK LIENKE, STRUGGLING FOR AIR: POWER PLANTS AND THE
“WAR ON COAL” (2016).
46. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510
(Oct. 23, 2015).
47. Id. at 64,665. The NSPS standards for new and modified power plants were not
expected to change significantly the net benefits of the two regulations, as modeling
“indicate[d] that, even in the absence of [the NSPS] rule, (i) existing and anticipated
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Once again, though, the courts stopped EPA. In February of
2016, the Supreme Court issued a surprising stay of enforcement of
the Clean Power Plan pending the resolution of litigation in the
lower courts. 48 Then, while the litigation proceeded slowly in the
D.C. Circuit, the tidal shift in environmental policy that was the
election of President Trump occurred. Under Trump, EPA has
formally proposed the rescission of the Clean Power Plan with the
so-called Affordable Clean Energy Rule and has begun the process
of withdrawing the United States from the recently ratified Paris
Climate Accord, among other actions. 49
Massachusetts v. EPA committed the United States to a primarily
federal regulatory response to the threat of climate change. 50 Even
as the substance of the regulatory efforts has seesawed between the
Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, there has never been
much doubt since Massachusetts that it is EPA’s responsibility to take
the lead on climate change policy using its authority under the
CAA (at least insofar as comprehensive climate change legislation is
not forthcoming). As the next section demonstrates, the Supreme
Court reinforced this trend when it held that most private litigation
alleging climate-related injuries was foreclosed by EPA’s efforts.
B. American Electric Power v. Connecticut and the Displacement of the
Litigation Track
In the early years after Massachusetts, climate advocates began to
explore another track to meaningful climate change policies—one
based not on regulation but on common law liability for private
emissions of greenhouse gases. But this “litigation track” was short
lived. When it came to policing climate changing emissions, the
economic conditions are such that few, if any fossil fuel-fired steam-generating EGUs will be
built in the foreseeable future, and (ii) utilities and project developers are expected to
choose new generation technologies (primarily NGCC) that would meet the final standards
and renewable generating sources that are not affected by these final standards.” Id. at
64,515.
48. Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, WASH.
POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-court-puts-the-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-powerplan/?utm_term=.d962d09864bd [https://perma.cc/6A8T-RVFX] (describing the case and
the Court’s surprising and unprecedented decision).
49. See Editorial Board, Trump Imperils the Planet, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (Dec. 26, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/opinion/editorials/climate-change-environmenttrump.html [https://perma.cc/H8WJ-L35L].
50.
Osofsky & Peel, supra note 26, at 224 (“EPA regulation pursuant to
[Massachusetts] . . . has served as the core of the U.S. federal efforts on climate change.”).
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Supreme Court’s answer was clear: there was “no room for a
parallel track” of climate change regulation. 51
1. The Federal Common Law of Public Nuisance
Operating alongside statutory and regulatory environmental
protections, the federal common law of public nuisance “protects
the public against unreasonable and substantial interference with a
public right.” 52 What rights are included is not entirely clear, but
the doctrine roughly covers “rights in health, safety, and comfort
that are not necessarily tied to land or a particular resource.” 53
What differentiates federal public nuisance from ordinary public
nuisance, which has a long lineage in state common law, is federal
jurisdiction, which is established by Article III, Section 2’s grant of
original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to resolve disputes
between states or between states and citizens of another state. 54
States have a quasi-sovereign interest in reducing environmental
harms that originate out-of-state but affect the state’s citizenry. 55
The Supreme Court has developed the federal common law of
public nuisance in a series of environmental cases spanning over a
century. 56 Indeed, as Robert Percival has observed, “[p]rior to the
enactment of comprehensive federal regulatory statutes, the
common law of nuisance was the first line of legal defense for the
51. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 425–27 (2011).
52. Albert C. Lin, Public Trust and Public Nuisance: Common Law Peas in a Pod?, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2012) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) & cmt.
a (AM. LAW INST. 1979)). According to the Court, the federal common law of public
nuisance exists notwithstanding the familiar adage from Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
78 (1938), that there “is no federal general common law” because the it is uniquely
concerned with “areas of national concern” that are suited to the development of “federal
decisional law.” Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 420–21.
53. Lin, supra note 52, at 1078.
54. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. In a later case, the Supreme Court held that public nuisance
suits under federal common law need not be heard originally by the Court, but could in fact
be heard as usual in federal district court under general federal question jurisdiction.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1972).
55. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
56. Other scholars have offered more comprehensive treatments of the federal common
law of public nuisance than the one I will offer here, which is simply intended to provide
critical background. For an account of the rise of the doctrine, see Paul J. Wahlbeck, The
Development of a Legal Rule: The Federal Common Law of Public Nuisance, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
613 (1998), and Benjamin P. Harper, Climate Change Litigation: The Federal Common Law of
Interstate Nuisance and Federalism Concerns, 40 GA. L. REV. 661 (2006). For commentary on
much of the current litigation using the common law of nuisance to address climate
change—much of which serves as a model for the litigation urged in this Article—see Lin &
Burger, supra note 7.
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environment. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court itself heard many prominent disputes between
states over transboundary air and water pollution.” 57 For instance,
in 1906 the Court recognized the possibility of using public
nuisance to remediate the contamination of public water that
occurred when the City of Chicago, aiming to protect Lake
Michigan, reversed the flow of the Chicago River and directed its
sewage down the Illinois River and into the Mississippi River.58 Just
a year later, the Court recognized the possibility of states suing
private defendants in a case involving two Tennessee Copper
Company smelters that spewed sulfur dioxide across state lines and
into Georgia. 59 The Court continued to hear similar cases for
decades, 60 sometimes appointing special masters to oversee the
technical and scientific questions raised by the litigation. 61
Ordinarily, the relief in these cases took the form of an injunction
to abate the nuisance, although in recent decades it has become
clear that money damages of some kind are suitable remedies as
well.
The scope of the federal common law of public nuisance action
is elastic. The essential elements are a public right—usually
enjoyment of a common resource, such as water or air—and an
unreasonable interference with that right caused by a defendant,
either public or private. 62 Beyond this, the Court has described
57. Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law’s Growing Shadow,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 113.
58. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
59. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230.
60. See, e.g., New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931) (issuing an injunction
against New York’s dumping of sewage into the Atlantic Ocean); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278
U.S. 367 (1929) (issuing an injunction against Illinois’s excessive drawing of Lake Michigan
water, which had lowered the lake level for neighboring states). Occasionally, the Court
declined to recognize public nuisance actions. See, e.g., Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp.,
401 U.S. 493 (1971) (refusing to hear a case alleging private defendants created a public
nuisance by dumping mercury in Lake Erie); Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (rejecting
Illinois’s bid for a public nuisance action against Wisconsin cities for dumping sewage that
contaminated Lake Michigan, which was Chicago’s main source of drinking water);
Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972); Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270
(1974) (per curiam) (declining to approve a settlement in a dispute involving pollution from
a paper mill because the Court saw it as inconsistent with the judicial role to police
compliance with the settlement without any law to apply).
61. Nevitt & Percival, supra note 6, at 452–53.
62. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A
successful public nuisance claim generally requires proof that a defendant’s activity
unreasonably interfered with the use or enjoyment of a public right and thereby caused the
public-at-large substantial and widespread harm.”).
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these suits as requiring a court to “appraise the equities” on either
side of an environmental dispute. 63 As a result of this elasticity,
climate change litigants began to think about the possibility of
using the public nuisance concept to address climate-related
harms. The right to a habitable planet might be thought of as the
quintessential public right. 64
The main limit on the scope of the public nuisance doctrine is
the concept of “displacement,” which holds that the federal
common law is no longer available where there is already statutory
law that fills the role. 65 The displacement question is somewhat
similar to preemption (which applies to state law), 66 although,
critically, it is closer to conflict preemption than field preemption
in that it does not hinge on evidence of congressional purpose or
intent. 67 Instead, the focus is on whether the remedy sought in a
public nuisance suit would be duplicated by, and therefore

63. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 107. More recently, however, the Court has cautioned that
courts “do not have creative power akin to that vested in Congress” and should ordinarily
rely on the “readymade body of state law as the federal rule of decision until Congress strikes
a different accommodation.” Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 422
(2011).
64. See generally David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in
Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1791–94 (2007); David A. Grossman,
Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 1, 53 (2003) (noting that the “enjoyment of the natural environment” constitutes a public
right).
65. See, e.g., Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1980) (holding that
Illinois’s nuisance action against Wisconsin cities was displaced by the passage of the Clean
Water Act); Middlesex Cty. Sewarage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981)
(finding displacement of ocean dumping nuisance claims under the Ocean Dumping Act).
Note, however, that the Court expressly declined to hold that comprehensive federal
regulatory schemes would displace state common law public nuisance actions. See Int’l Paper
Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 498–500 (1987).
66. Harper, supra note 56, at 680.
67. See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316–17 (“[W]hen the question is whether federal
statutory or federal common law governs . . . [,] the same sort of evidence of a clear and
manifest purpose is not required.”); see generally R. Trent Taylor, The Obsolescence of
Environmental Common Law, 40 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 1 (2013) (comparing and contrasting
preemption and displacement). The distinctions become critical in understanding why,
even if the Clean Air Act’s silence as to agriculture, see infra Part III, evinces “a clear and
manifest purpose” to set essentially no greenhouse gas emission policy for agriculture, it does
not mean there is displacement of nuisance liability. Common law liability can still exist so
long as there is not direct regulation of the same conduct, and an implied exemption
arguably does not rise to that level of specificity. See also Zachary Hennessee, Note,
Resurrecting a Doctrine on its Deathbed: Revisiting Federal Common Law Greenhouse Gas Litigation
After Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 67 DUKE L.J. 1073, 1094 (2018) (“This suggests that
the field displacement theory contending that silence in a comprehensive statute may
evidence a legislative intent not to regulate is incompatible with AEP’s reasoning.”).
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interfere with, applicable federal statutory programs 68—indeed, the
displacement cases expressly acknowledge that federal common law
will play a supplemental role to environmental statutory regimes,
filling in interstices and gaps left by Congress. 69 For instance, in a
2008 case involving claims arising from the Exxon Valdez oil spill,
the Court focused the displacement inquiry on whether the claims
“threaten . . . interference with federal regulatory goals,” finding
that the common law suit in that case did not threaten the
implementation of the Clean Water Act and filled a gap left by the
statute. 70 In climate change nuisance litigation, the displacement
inquiry has become the central issue and the biggest hurdle.
2. The American Electric Power Case and Its Aftermath
Climate change was implicated under the federal common law of
nuisance for the first time in 2004, when a coalition of states and
the City of New York filed suit, alleging that electric utilities were
collectively liable for their emission of up to ten percent of U.S.
emissions of CO2 and that these contributions to climate change
were unreasonably interfering with the public rights of citizens to
an unchanged climate. 71 The coalition sought an injunction
limiting CO2 emissions, all in the hope of spurring a shift to
68. See Molly M. Watters, Note, Fish and Federalism: How the Asian Carp Litigation Highlights
a Deficiency in the Federal Common Law Displacement Analysis, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 535,
557 (2013) (arguing that AEP analogized displacement to conflict preemption analysis).
69. See Dan Mensher, Common Law on Ice: Using Federal Judge-Made Nuisance Law to Address
the Interstate Effects of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 ENVTL. L. 463 (2007):
How much common law a statute displaces is determined through a two-part analysis.
First, if legislation precedes common law, ‘courts are not free to ‘supplement’
Congress’[s] [enactment]. In such cases, courts may only add law to areas left
unaddressed by the statutory scheme, as courts presume that Congress intended its
statute to be the sole rule of law. Second, if Congress legislates against the background
of preexisting common law, the opposite presumption prevails. Courts in this situation
are to presume that Congress intended its legislation to enhance the common law rules
in specific areas, but to leave the rest of the existing common law rules in place to fill
the gaps left in the legislative framework. Congress can displace preexisting common
law, but absent an explicit desire to do so, courts are to continue applying the common
law unless the statute specifically addresses the issue before the court.
Id. at 471–72.
70. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
71. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 380 (2d Cir. 2009). This suit was
not the only climate suit filed on the federal common law of nuisance theory. Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 05-cv-436, 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007); Native
Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). See also
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007)
(rejecting nuisance suit by California against six car manufacturers for their alleged
contributions to climate change impacts as a nonjusticiable political question).
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renewable energy sources. Countering the coalition’s claims,
American Electric Power Company and its co-defendants argued
that the case was non-justiciable for a host of reasons, including
that the CAA had displaced the federal common law of public
nuisance with respect to emissions of air pollutants.
Although the Second Circuit rejected the displacement
arguments and held that the suit could proceed, 72 a unanimous
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the CAA had in fact
displaced the federal common law of public nuisance as it relates to
greenhouse gas emissions from power plants. 73 The Court clarified
the standard for displacement: “The test for whether congressional
legislation excludes the declaration of federal common law is
simply whether the statute ‘speak[s] directly to [the] question’ at
issue.” 74 That is, the “relevant question . . . is ‘whether the field has
been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular
manner.’” 75 Hence, it is irrelevant whether EPA is in fact
regulating CO2 emissions from power plants—the point is that it
has been delegated the authority to do so. 76 As the Court noted,
after determining that a particular category of stationary sources
causes or contributes to air pollution that endangers public health
or welfare, EPA “must establish standards of performance for
emission of pollutants from new or modified sources within that
category” and may also be required to develop regulations of
“existing sources within the same category.” 77
In the wake of American Electric Power, climate change plaintiff
states and municipalities have continued to press public nuisance
claims in court, but to no avail. In each instance, displacement
under the CAA has proven to be an insurmountable barrier to
federal jurisdiction. For example, in Native Village of Kivalina v.
72. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 380.
73. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) (“We hold that the
Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to
seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”).
74. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436
U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).
75. Id. at 426.
76. David R. Brody, Case Comment, American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 36
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 300 (2012) (“It is the delegation of authority, not its exercise,
which displaces federal common law.”) (citing Am. Elec. Power Co., 549 U.S. at 426); see
also Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 777 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Congress’s
decision to assign a particular problem to an executive agency or its description of an
agency’s role in addressing a problem may be evidence of displacement, but the ebb and
flow of agency action neither diminishes nor increases the role of federal common law.”).
77. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A)–(B), (d)).
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ExxonMobil Corp., an indigenous Alaskan village sued ExxonMobil
for climate change-related public nuisance, but the Ninth Circuit
held that the CAA displaced public nuisance claims concerning
“domestic greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources.” 78
Likewise, in Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, a case involving
the failure to control the spread of invasive Asian carp through
Chicago’s waterways, the Seventh Circuit likened the displacement
analysis to field preemption, writing that the “important
displacement question is whether Congress has provided a
sufficient legislative solution to the particular interstate
nuisance . . . to warrant a conclusion that this legislation has
occupied the field to the exclusion of federal common law.” 79 That
panel held that the public nuisance action was not displaced
because, “[f]or better or for worse, congressional efforts to curb
the migration of invasive species, and of invasive carp in particular,
have yet to reach the level of detail one sees in the air or water
pollution schemes,” 80 despite the fact that Congress was clearly
“aware of the problem” and had passed numerous acts to
appropriate funds to the Army Corps of Engineers to develop
underwater electronic barriers to prevent migration of the fish. 81
The Seventh Circuit, though, emphasized that the limited statutory
attention to the fish bore “little resemblance to the regulatory
power that the EPA wields under the Clean Air Act.” 82
More recently, several cities have filed separate lawsuits raising
similar claims that major oil companies’ production, marketing,
and sale of fossil fuels contributed to climate change, creating a
public nuisance. 83 According to many of the complaints, the fossil
fuel companies had “early knowledge of climate change risks” but
nevertheless “extensively promoted fossil fuels for pervasive use,
while denying or downplaying these threats.” 84 In one of the first
cases to result in a decision, Judge Alsup of the Northern District of
California reiterated his earlier order that the federal common law
78. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2012).
79. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d at 777; see generally Christopher Grubb, Note, Worthy
of Their Name? Addressing Aquatic Nuisance Species with Common Law Public Nuisance Claims, 87
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 237 (2012).
80. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d at 778–79.
81. Id. at 780.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., City of New York v. BP p.l.c., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); King
County v. BP p.l.c., 2018 WL 4385448 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 31, 2018); City of Oakland v. BP
p.l.c., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
84. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 469.
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of public nuisance, not the state-level equivalents, necessarily
governed because of the complex inter-jurisdictional issues
implicated by global climate change. 85 Then, citing American
Electric Power, the court dismissed the suit on the ground that the
federal common law of public nuisance had been displaced by the
CAA’s extensive scheme for regulating greenhouse gas emissions
from stationary sources. 86 While the case is currently pending
appeal, the result seems preordained, given American Electric Power’s
position on the CAA’s displacing effect on any claim related to the
direct emission of greenhouse gases by the electric power sector. 87
II. FILLING THE GAP: ANIMAL AGRICULTURE AS CLIMATE NUISANCE
If federal climate policy in the United States is to advance over
the near future, the courts will have to take the lead. The first two
years of the Trump administration have seen the attempted
decimation of EPA’s regulatory program under the CAA. Any
climate legislation can be considered dead on arrival even should it
proceed through the Republican held Senate.
On the
international level, President Trump has made it clear that the
United States will not accede to any limitations on its greenhouse
gas emissions. In short, for the time being, the regulatory track is
leading nowhere.
However, American Electric Power’s conclusion that the CAA
displaces the federal common law of public nuisance severely
restricts courts’ ability to fill the gap. The logic behind the Court’s
displacement analysis in American Electric Power centers on the
intuitive notion that the CAA is a comprehensive regulatory
85. Id. at 471 (“Widespread global dispersal is exactly the type of ‘transboundary
pollution suit []’ to which federal common law should apply.”) (citing Native Vill. of Kivalina
v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 855–58 (9th Cir. 2012)) (alteration in original).
86. Id. at 472–75.
87. It is possible that the Ninth Circuit will hold that the District Court erred in
construing the claims as federal public nuisance claims. See Lin & Burger, supra note 7
(contending that the District Court arguably erred on this point). If this occurs, plaintiffs
would have another way around the displacement barrier—i.e., operating entirely under the
state common law of public nuisance. The question would then be whether federal law
preempts the state law causes of action. The Court has not given clear answers about the
extent of preemption in this domain. Id. In addition, state common law claims would
presumably be subject to state-level “Right-to-Farm” laws that often bar nuisance claims
against agricultural operations. See Alexandra Lizano & Elizabeth Rumley, States’ Right-toFarm Statutes, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., https://nationalaglawcenter.org/state-compilations/
right-to-farm/ [https://perma.cc/PZM2-ARX9] (last visited Apr. 21, 2019) (noting that all
fifty states have enacted statutes that bar nuisance suits).
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framework for the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from the
electric power and transportation sectors. As the legislative history
of the CAA shows, Congress did indeed aim to “fashion[] effective
strategies” for the control of “numerous highly diversified sources,”
from “millions of automobiles driven on city streets or interstate
highways to a relatively limited number of facilities and plants
which are large-scale polluters such as powerplants burning coal or
fuel oil.” 88 The approach the CAA takes is to impose technologybased limitations on this set of sources at the pollutants’ points of
origin (e.g., a smokestack). This leaves little room for competing
emissions limitations imposed by courts, and it is easy to see how
such limitations could substantially interfere with Congress’s ability
to set policy through a delegation of rulemaking authority to EPA.
Nevertheless, the CAA is not all encompassing when it comes to
greenhouse gas emissions. As the Supreme Court itself noted in
American Electric Power, “we each emit carbon dioxide merely by
breathing,” yet Congress plainly never intended the CAA to reach
these activities. 89 There must be limits to the scope of the CAA,
and in many cases the displacement analysis will have to grapple
with the issue-specific inquiry into whether the CAA really
“speak[s] directly to [the] question.” 90 As the rest of this section
demonstrates, one major industry that the CAA arguably does not
speak directly to is the animal agriculture industry.
The
implication of this is that climate nuisance suits against animal
agricultural operations should be able to survive displacement in
court.
A. The Climate Impacts of Animal Agriculture
Worldwide and nationally, agricultural production is a major
contributor to climate change, estimated by some to account for

88. See, e.g., House Report on the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, H.R. REP. 91-1146,
at 15 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5371.
89. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 426 (2011). In fact, the Court has
repeatedly emphasized the absurdity of the notion that the CAA reaches beyond
conventional industrial sources of air pollution. In Utility Air Regulatory Group, for instance,
the Court scoffed at the idea that EPA could ever extend its PSD and Title V programs to all
sources emitting 100- or 250-tons-per-year level (including churches and schools), opining
that a claim of such “extravagant statutory power over the national economy . . . would
render the statute ‘unrecognizable to the Congress that designed’ it.” Util. Air Reg. Grp. v.
EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014).
90. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424.
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about one-third of greenhouse gas emissions. 91 This is roughly
equivalent to, perhaps in excess of, the amount contributed by all
The majority of these
transportation-related activities. 92
agricultural impacts—up to 18 percent of total global greenhouse
gas emissions—are attributable to the livestock production cycle. 93
The contributions can be direct or indirect.
On the direct side, livestock (especially ruminant livestock, such
as cattle or sheep 94) produce and emit vast quantities of methane
gas, an extremely potent greenhouse gas. 95 They produce and emit
lower but still substantial quantities of nitrous oxide, another
greenhouse gas. 96 Together, these direct emissions from livestock
account for approximately 9 percent of global greenhouse gas
emissions. 97
Indirect emissions are harder to see but just as consequential.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) of the United
Nations has released several reports assessing greenhouse gas
contributions associated with the entire supply chain for livestock. 98
The entire life cycle of the livestock industry includes several
different pathways for greenhouse gas emissions, including:
. . . fossil fuels used to produce mineral fertilizers used in feed
production . . . ; methane release from the breakdown of fertilizers
and from animal manure; land-use changes for feed production and
for grazing; land degradation; fossil fuel use during feed and animal

91. Vermeulen et al., supra note 14 at 198; see generally Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note
15 (reviewing the many sources of emissions in the food system and the known methods of
reducing these emissions).
92. HENNING STEINFELD ET AL., U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., LIVESTOCK’S LONG SHADOW:
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS (2006), http://www.fao.org/3/a0701e/a0701e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8SAY-KPX7].
93. M. Gill, P. Smith & J.M. Wilkinson, Mitigating Climate Change: The Role of Domestic
Livestock, 4 ANIMAL 323 (2010).
94. William J. Ripple et al., Ruminants, Climate Change and Climate Policy, 4 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2014).
95. See, e.g., STEINFELD ET AL., supra note 92, at 271 tbl.7.1 (noting that livestock produces
37 percent of methane emissions worldwide); Agence France-Presse, Methane Emissions from
Cattle Are 11% Higher than Estimated, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/sep/29/methane-emissions-cattle-11percent-higher-than-estimated [https://perma.cc/TN9R-56VP].
96. STEINFELD ET AL., supra note 92, at 271 tbl.7.1 (noting that livestock produces 65
percent of nitrous oxide emissions).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 272; P.J. GERBER ET AL., U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., TACKLING CLIMATE CHANGE
THROUGH LIVESTOCK: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF EMISSIONS AND MITIGATION OPPORTUNITIES
(2013), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3437e.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP3W-SS9P].
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production; [and] fossil fuel use in production and transport of
processed and refrigerated animal products. 99

This resource-intensive process is more problematic because the
resources are almost entirely wasted with the substantial losses of
energy value from conversion of feed to muscle. For instance, 97
percent of the caloric value of the feed inputs involved with beef
production is lost by the time it reaches our plates. 100 By one
estimate, a meat-eating diet doubles the carbon footprint of any
given person relative to a vegan diet. 101 Moreover, in severely
depleting other natural resources, such as water, animal agriculture
renders the world less resilient to the impacts of climate change
that is already occurring. With the global production of meat likely
to double by 2050, 102 the problem will only become worse as the
threat from climate change grows. 103
It bears mentioning, as well, that there is enormous climate
change mitigation potential even with fairly modest shifts in dietary
patterns. For instance, several studies have modeled the mitigation
potential of a shift in meat consumption to nutritionally
recommended levels, finding that between 2.15 and 5.6 gigatons of
CO2 equivalent could be eliminated per year. 104 To put that in
perspective, the 2017 estimate of the “emissions gap,” measuring
the difference between the 2.0 degree target global temperature
level and the conditional “Nationally Determined Contributions” in
the Paris Accord, was 11 to 13.5 gigatons of CO2 equivalent. 105 In
99. Gill, Smith & Wilkinson, supra note 93, at 323.
100. Alon Shepon et al., Energy and Protein Feed-to-Food Conversion Efficiencies in the US and
Potential Food Security Gains from Dietary Changes, 11 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 1–2 (2016).
101. Peter Scarborough et al., Dietary Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Meat-Eaters, Fish-Eaters,
Vegetarians and Vegans in the UK, 125 CLIMATE CHANGE 179, 179 (2014).
102. Meat & Meat Products, U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/
themes/en/meat/home.html [https://perma.cc/Y7G2-MFTE] (last visited on Mar. 2, 2019).
103. M.J. MacLeod et al., Invited Review: A Position on the Global Livestock Environmental
Assessment Model (GLEAM), 12 ANIMAL 383, 384 (2018) (“If the GHG emissions intensities
(Ei) (i.e. the kg of GHG per kg of animal product) of livestock commodities are not
reduced, the forecast increases in production will lead to proportionate increases in GHG
emissions, compromising efforts towards climate change mitigation.”).
104. See ROB BAILEY, ANTONY FROGGATT & LAURA WELLESLEY, LIVESTOCK—CLIMATE
CHANGE’S FORGOTTEN SECTOR: GLOBAL PUBLIC OPINION ON MEAT AND DAIRY CONSUMPTION
12
(2014),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/
20141203LivestockClimateChangeForgottenSectorBaileyFroggattWellesleyFinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y9BY-SNZR].
105. JOHN CHRISTENSEN ET AL., U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT
2017: A UN ENVIRONMENT SYNTHESIS REPORT xvii (2017), https://wedocs.unep.org/
bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/22070/EGR_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T4S-Y23Y].
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other words, eating the appropriate amount of meat for a healthy
diet could get the world halfway where it needs to be to avoid the
worst effects of climate change. Likewise, the FAO estimates that a
“30 percent reduction of GHG emissions would be possible, for
example, if producers in a given [animal agriculture] system,
region and climate adopted the technologies and practice currently
used by the 10 percent of producers with the lowest emission
intensity.” 106
B. Agricultural Exceptionalism and the CAA
As discussed in Part I.A, the CAA is now widely understood to
contain a framework for regulating the climate change impacts of
electric generation and transportation, even if the details of that
framework have yet to be worked out. The same cannot be said
about the CAA when it comes to animal agriculture. 107
To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to understand
how the animal agriculture sector is organized, as well as how it is
not organized. As many have noted, there has been a fundamental
change in recent decades from an almost pastoral model of animal
rearing and slaughter to an industrial model marked by vertical
integration by a small set of leading industry players (e.g., Tyson,
Cargill, Smithfield, etc.). 108 The concentration of power on the
meatpacker, or buyer, side means that small farmers who rear the
animals and prepare them for slaughter often feel pressure to
establish stable relationships with the dominant meatpackers. 109
Small farmers now often enter into contracts with meatpackers to
raise livestock using a highly efficient and arguably cruel system of

106. GERBER ET AL., supra note 98, at xiii.
107. See generally Ruhl, supra note 23; CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL32948, AIR QUALITY ISSUES AND ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: A PRIMER 7 (2005) (“[U]nder the
Clean Air Act (CAA), most agricultural sources escape that law’s regulatory programs
because the majority of them do not meet the CAA’s minimum emission quantity
thresholds.”); Sarah C. Wilson, Hogwash! Why Industrial Animal Agriculture Is Not Beyond the
Scope of Clean Air Act Regulation, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 450–51 (2007) (noting that “the
government has historically graced agriculture with special treatment, expressly exempting
the industry or simply not addressing it at all”).
108. See Susan M. Brehm, From Red Barn to Facility: Changing Environmental Liability to Fit
the Changing Structure of Livestock Production, 93 CAL. L. REV. 797 (2005); PEW COMM’N ON
INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD., PUTTING MEAT ON THE TABLE: INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL
PRODUCTION
IN
AMERICA
(2008),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/
uploadedfiles/phg/content_level_pages/reports/pcifapfinalpdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PFH3-5UH3].
109. Brehm, supra note 108.
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animal feeding operations involving close confinement of the
animals. 110 Most notorious among these are so-called concentrated
animal feeding operations (“CAFOs”), which can hold hundreds of
thousands of animals in confinement. 111 After farmers raise the
animals for some time, the animals are shipped to the vertical
integrator for slaughter in a processing plant. 112
As industrial as this model is compared to the bucolic 1950s, it is
not industrial enough to fit the mold set out by the CAA. Starting
with the CAA’s permitting programs, the reality is that animals in
the industrial agriculture system spend their short lives going
through discrete stages at an incredibly diverse set of sites, 113 almost
all of which are guaranteed to be below the thresholds for
emissions at which the permits would be required. In order to
reach greenhouse gases under the PSD or Title V programs, EPA
would have to be able to require permits for the emission of nongreenhouse gas emissions such as ammonia, volatile organic
compounds, particulate matter, and hydrogen sulfide. 114 Under

110. Id. This contract model is especially typified by the poultry industry, in which
packers have made wide use of production contracts to control every aspect of the feeding
and rearing of broilers. See Contracting in the Poultry Industry, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/42203/13405_aib748c_1_.pdf?v=0
(last
visited Apr. 24, 2019); Craig Watts, Under Contract: Farmers and the Fine Print, A Brutally Honest
Look at Contract Poultry, FARM AID BLOG (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.farmaid.org/
issues/industrial-agriculture/under-contract-farmers-fine-print-honest-look-contract-poultry/
[https://perma.cc/4L7C-C8AT].
111. CAFOs are defined as a point source by the Clean Water Act (a rare exception to
the general silence of environmental statutes on agriculture) and, therefore, are required to
obtain a permit for discharging pollutants into water. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2018). EPA
has promulgated regulations delineating the distinctions between different tiers of CAFOs.
See Regulatory Definitions of Large CAFOs, Medium CAFO, and Small CAFOs, ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/sector_table.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XC8V-DB85] (last visited Mar. 2, 2019).
112. James M. MacDonald, CAFOs: Farm Animals and Industrialized Livestock Production, in
OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE
5
(2018),
http://oxfordre.com/environmentalscience/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199389414.001.00
01/acrefore-9780199389414-e-240?print=pdf [https://perma.cc/M4LV-8MSD] (reviewing
the organization of industrial agriculture).
113. Id. (noting that beef production, like pork, “is arranged into separate stages”
including cow-calf operations, stocker operations, and industrial feedlot operations, and that
“integration across stages” is “still a rare phenomenon”).
114. Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 333–34 (2014) (“We hold that EPA
exceeded its statutory authority when it interpreted the Clean Air Act to require PSD and
Title V permitting for stationary sources based on their greenhouse-gas emissions.
Specifically, the Agency may not treat greenhouse gases as a pollutant for purposes of
defining a ‘major emitting facility’ (or a ‘modification’ thereof) in the PSD context or a
‘major source’ in the Title V context. To the extent its regulations purport to do so, they are
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the operative provisions, these “anyway” sources would have to
exceed at least 100 tons per year of a designated pollutant. 115 The
modal livestock farm is far too small to meet these thresholds for
“anyway” pollutants. The USDA has estimated that in 1997 there
were 1.32 million farms holding livestock. 116 Approximately 1.08
million of these farms held less than four animals, 117 even though
the animals raised on these farms were likely sold to a major
meatpacker on a spot market and transported to a CAFO. 118 For
these kinds of sites, and even for medium-sized CAFOs
(approximately 500 animal units), there is essentially no chance
that sites will meet the 100 tons per year de minimis thresholds for
the non-greenhouse gas pollutants that must provide the hook for
permit requirements. 119 Only about 12,000 farms would be
considered large CAFOs under EPA’s definitions (i.e., holding at
least 1,000 individual animals, and often many more). 120 Even
there, most large CAFOs will not meet the thresholds: taking EPA’s
own estimates at face value, a beef farm would need nearly 5,000
animal units to cross the 100 ton-per-year de minimis threshold for

invalid. EPA may, however, continue to treat greenhouse gases as a ‘pollutant subject to
regulation under this chapter’ for purposes of requiring BACT for ‘anyway’ sources.”).
115. See Teresa B. Clemmer, Agriculture and the Clean Air Act, in FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 163, 166 (Mary Jane Angelo, Jason J. Czarnezki & William S. Eubanks
eds., 2013).
116. ROBERT L. KELLOGG, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., PROFILE OF FARMS WITH LIVESTOCK IN
THE UNITED STATES: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY (2002), https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/
portal/nrcs/detail/national/home/?cid=nrcs143_014121 [https://perma.cc/55U3-ZXQ3].
117. Id. Of note, the USDA defines animal units by each 1,000 pounds of live weight,
whereas EPA measures units by head. Id.
118. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33325, LIVESTOCK MARKETING AND COMPETITION ISSUES 8
(2009) (noting that “alternative marketing arrangements” to production contracts and
marketing contracts, such as spot market sales, accounted for 38 percent of slaughter-ready
beef cattle volume and 89 percent of finished hog volume). Vertical integration is much
more common and developed in the poultry market. See MacDonald, supra note 112.
119. A 2001 EPA study found that 500 animal-unit cattle farms emitted 11.2 tons per year
of ammonia, 1.4 tons per year of nitrous oxide, and 3.2 tons per year of particulate matter.
Swine farms with 500 animal units emitted 15 tons per year of ammonia, 0.021 tons per year
of nitrous oxide, 2.6 tons per year of hydrogen sulfide, 0.6 tons per year of volatile organic
compounds, and 2.0 tons per year of particulate matter. Poultry farms with 500 animal units
emitted 13 tons per year of ammonia, 1.8 tons per year of nitrous oxide and 2.1 tons per year
of particulate matter. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EMISSIONS FROM ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS tbls.8-12, 8-18 & 8-19 (2001), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/chief/ap42/ch09/
draft/draftanimalfeed.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDW6-ZMUP] [hereinafter EMISSIONS FROM
ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS]. The study unfortunately did not look into carbon dioxide
emissions associated with animal feeding operations.
120. KELLOGG, supra note 116.
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the PSD and Title V programs. 121 While a handful of sites might
exceed thresholds for certain pollutants, 122 feeding operations of
this size comprise an exceedingly small slice of the overall pie.
In short, the animal agriculture industry is just disaggregated
enough that it flies under the radar of the major permitting
programs in the CAA. Were one to aggregate all the emissions at
all sites, treating the system as one large bubble, then the
thresholds would easily be exceeded and regulators would be able
to require greenhouse gas permits at these sites as well. However,
the CAA contains no language that would allow EPA’s authority to
be stretched over the entirety of the animal agriculture system’s
discrete stages or to aggregate the many different “anyway”
emissions that they produce. Moreover, it is not clear under
American Electric Power whether piecemeal, site-by-site regulatory
programs like Title V and PSD would be enough to displace a
public nuisance action asking for a comprehensive and uniform
solution were it otherwise applicable in individual instances.
It might be argued that the 1.32 million individual sites in the
livestock production system are potentially subject to
comprehensive regulation under the CAA’s NSPS program, since
unlike the CAA’s permitting programs, it requires no threshold
amount of pollution and applies to an entire industry. For NSPS to
apply, the only requirement is that the EPA Administrator
determine that the category of sources is in fact a category of
When this
“stationary sources” as defined by the Act. 123
determination is made, new sources in the category must
implement the “best system of emission reduction.” 124 To date,
though, the Administrator has not defined animal feeding
operations, or farms more generally, as stationary sources
warranting an NSPS. Indeed, the closest category recognized is
grain elevators. 125
121. This assumes a linear relationship between the rate of emission estimated by EPA’s
2001 report and the number of animal units (for instance, the report found a rate of 11.2
tons per year of ammonia emissions at 500 animal-unit beef farms, which suggests that
getting to 100 tons per year would require the size to rise to nearly 5,000 animal units). See
EMISSIONS FROM ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS, supra note 119.
122. See Clemmer, supra note 115, at 171–72 (recounting EPA’s efforts in the early 2000s
to enforce the PSD and Title V programs against select CAFOs before the EPA entered into a
consent decree staying enforcement against the industry altogether).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2018).
124. Id. § 7411(a)(1).
125. See Clean Air Act Standards and Guidelines for Agriculture, Food and Forestry, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-

324

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 44:S

There are good reasons for the exclusion. By statute, a stationary
source is “any building, structure, facility, or installation which
emits or may emit any air pollutant.” 126 The direct source of the
emissions—the livestock—are not buildings, structures, facilities, or
installations, at least not in ordinary English.
Moreover,
categorizing herds of cattle and pigs as sources of air pollution
would make little functional sense, given the nature of the
performance standards that EPA would be obliged to develop. It is
easy to develop “best system[s] of emission reduction” for
“stationary” structures like smokestacks; less so for belching
livestock who might be roaming about a property. 127 The feeding
operations and other sites through which the animals pass could
perhaps be considered facilities, but in practice they are not
uniform enough to be a cognizable category. EPA said almost
exactly this in denying a petition from the Humane Society and
other groups that asked EPA to promulgate NSPS for CAFOs.
According to EPA, even within the special category of CAFOs,
which has a rather precise, facility-like definition in EPA’s
regulations, 128 there is simply too much diversity of design,
operation, and environment to permit the development of uniform
control technologies. 129 That diversity increases exponentially
when all animal feeding operations are considered, where the
number of discrete operations grows from more than 18,000 to
450,000. 130 As a result, the chances are vanishingly small that EPA
pollution/clean-air-act-standards-and-guidelines-agriculture-food-and
[https://perma.cc/H9K2-WT8Q].
126. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (2018).
127. Id. § 7411(a)(1). Some might argue that these factors irrelevant and that EPA could
design an NSPS to handle the complexities involved with animals by analogizing to the Clean
Water Act’s regulation of water pollution from CAFOs using a “nonpoint source” framework.
See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 289–90 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing the
Clean Water Act’s authority for requiring states to submit and earn approval for plans for
regulating nonpoint sources of water pollution); see also Mary Jane Angelo & James F.
Choate, Agriculture and the Clean Water Act, in FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
147, 156 (Mary Jane Angelo, Jason J. Czarnezki & William S. Eubanks eds., 2013). This
overlooks the fact that the CAA has no parallel statutory authority for imposing nonpoint
source regulation of air emissions. Any attempt by EPA to implement nonpoint source NSPS
of animal feeding operations would be highly vulnerable to judicial review.
128. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (2018).
129. Letter from E. Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Tom Frantz,
President, Association of Irritated Residents (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0638-0003 [https://perma.cc/3S4K-42G6] (follow link
titled “View document”).
130. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 17-P-0396, ELEVEN YEARS
AFTER AGREEMENT, EPA HAS NOT DEVELOPED RELIABLE EMISSION ESTIMATION METHODS TO
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will ever develop NSPS for most animal agricultural operations, and
any effort to do so would necessarily be incomplete and legally
vulnerable.
Another potential avenue to applying the CAA to animal
agriculture, that in reality is a mirage, is the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) Program. Under the NAAQS
Program, EPA first sets permissible concentration levels for certain
criteria pollutants and then allows states to craft state
implementation plans (“SIPs”) to achieve compliance with the
standards. 131 Setting aside the fact that carbon dioxide is not
currently designated as a criteria pollutant and that EPA has simply
ignored a 2009 citizen petition to designate it as such, 132 it is in
theory possible that greenhouse gas emissions from farms could be
captured in SIPs. States have a great deal of flexibility in these
plans, so states could decide to use that authority to regulate
animal agricultural sources of emissions. 133 It is not clear, however,
that an isolated SIP or two that address greenhouse gas emissions
from animal farms would count for displacement in a federal
public nuisance suit seeking an industry-wide and nation-wide
remedy.
There is even less of a potential role for the CAA when it comes
to addressing the roughly half of animal agriculture emissions of
greenhouse gases that come indirectly from the entire production
cycle rather from the livestock themselves. For instance, one
reason animal agriculture affects climate change is because of the
loss of forest as farmers clear the land for grazing, yet the CAA
contains no provisions that plausibly delegate authority to EPA to
regulate decisions to clear forest for grazing. Similarly, feed for
livestock not only has its own emissions from the production
process, but also can make livestock produce and emit more
greenhouse gas. Again, though, the CAA would seem inapposite to
these impacts. The CAA might well cover some of these individual

DETERMINE WHETHER ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS COMPLY WITH CLEAN AIR ACT AND
OTHER STATUTES 1 (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-09/
documents/_epaoig_20170919-17-p-0396.pdf [https://perma.cc/D26F-4XE6].
131. See Summary of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-air-act
[https://perma.cc/WL22XHR9].
132. CHRIS WOLD, DAVID HUNTER & MELISSA POWERS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW
(2013).
133. Ruhl, supra note 23, at 306. Note that one good reason to bring a nuisance suit
would be to force the Court to urge EPA to respond to this petition.
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components of the production cycle, but it would not provide any
remedy as to the animal agriculture firms that use these inputs to
create a product with major independent impacts on the climate. 134
C. The Non-Displacement of Animal Agricultural Climate Nuisance
Suits
Of course, the reason for examining whether the CAA reaches
the animal agriculture sector is to determine whether a potential
federal common law of public nuisance suit against animal
agriculture firms would be displaced, as other climate nuisance
suits have been. As discussed above, the American Electric Power
Court explained that displacement occurs when there is a federal
regulatory statute that “speaks directly” to the question at issue. 135
By itself, the standard is somewhat cryptic—the Court simply held
that it was “plain that [the CAA] speaks directly to emissions of
carbon dioxide from the defendants’ plants.” 136 If the foregoing
discussion in Part II.B does nothing else, it makes it plain that the
application of the CAA to animal agricultural operations is
anything but “plain.” There are countless questions that would
have to be answered before EPA could think about regulating the
direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions associated with the
production of meat. Moreover, while a creative (or cavalier) EPA
might be able to find indirect ways to package the reduction of
greenhouse gases from animal feeding operations as a “co-benefit”
of some other regulatory program with clearer authorization 137—
i.e., to apply permitting programs to some small set of sites, 138 or to
push the envelope of the NSPS program 139—it is clear that there is
no real analogue to EPA’s authority to directly regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from fossil fuel sources, an authority that was central
134. It is for this reason that I do not see the Farm Bill as a source of displacement of the
federal common law of nuisance. Of course, the Farm Bill is a source of some sort of
agricultural policy, and its subsidy programs can be deployed as incentive-based tools for
regulation. But the Farm Bill is not a regulatory statute, and there is no opportunity, as
there was in American Electric Power, for plaintiffs to sue the USDA to dispute the allocation of
funding and subsidies that it establishes.
135. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011).
136. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. For instance, ammonia is likely toxic enough to be designated as a hazardous air
pollutant, Clemmer, supra note 115, at 168–69, and using the CAA’s hazardous air pollutant
provisions to control emissions of ammonia would have the co-benefit of reducing methane
emissions.
138. See supra notes 113–22.
139. See supra notes 126–30.
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to the American Electric Power Court’s reasoning. 140 In this respect,
the animal agriculture case seems closer to the Asian carp case in
the Seventh Circuit (where there were some oblique references to
the fish in federal statutes but less “detail” than is necessary for
displacement) than to the electric utilities in American Electric Power
(which going back decades have been the target of EPA
regulation). 141
Although some have interpreted the Court’s cryptic formulation
in American Electric Power as setting up a default that all
environmental nuisances and environmental torts are displaced, 142
it remains an open question whether the Court would be able to
maintain such a position in good faith where there is no realistic
possibility that the agency will ever act and the conduct in question
falls far outside the ordinary focus on the energy and
transportation sectors. In American Electric Power, it was not only
likely that EPA under the Obama Administration would soon act to
address the climate change contributions of the electric generation
sector, but it was possibly mandatory as well—at least that was the
thinking at the time after the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA
effectively ordered the agency to begin such action. 143 Thus, even if
an argument could be made that the CAA has delegated authority
over the entire field of greenhouse gas emissions, including from
the animal agricultural operations, the Court could well be
persuaded to narrow the displacement test where plaintiffs
establish that EPA has no plans to attempt to regulate animal
agriculture emissions.
If the Court did the opposite and
broadened the displacement of the federal common law of
nuisance, it would put more pressure on EPA to use whatever
powers the Court might think the agency has, and would certainly
open the agency to suit for failure to exercise those powers.
In short, there are good reasons to believe that a federal
common law of nuisance suit against animal agriculture firms could
survive the displacement hurdle. As the next Part demonstrates,
this would be an important development in climate law. Moreover,
140. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 425.
141. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 778–79 (7th Cir. 2011).
142. Brody, supra note 76, at 302.
143. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 425 (noting that if EPA failed to set emissions limits,
states and private parties could petition the agency and sue if the response was inadequate,
and further noting that the “agency agreed to complete that rulemaking by May 2012”).
This passage would suggest that EPA’s pending action was critically important to the Court’s
displacement holding.
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even if plaintiffs were to lose, the litigation itself would advance the
ball by clarifying policymakers’ responsibility for regulating
greenhouse gas emissions from the industry and catalyzing public
demand for regulation.
III. THE PROMISE OF THE APPROACH
Leading climate change scholars Jacqueline Peel and Hari
Osofsky have noted, “common law climate change cases to date
have not exerted a direct influence on the regulatory landscape.” 144
Overcoming the displacement barrier through a federal nuisance
suit against animal agriculture firms would go a long way toward
changing that fact. 145 In this Part, I first argue that displacement is
the biggest hurdle facing climate nuisance litigation, and that other
potential hurdles to a merits judgment are surmountable. I then
explain why such a suit would produce many desirable indirect
effects no matter the ultimate disposition. In short, I argue that a
federal public nuisance suit against the animal agriculture industry
would be a worthwhile endeavor.
A. The Path to Climatic Nuisance Liability for Animal Agriculture
Climate nuisance litigants have consistently stumbled on the
displacement question. Because courts have generally not had
occasion to reach the merits in any of the climate nuisance cases
brought against fossil fuel producers, there are open questions
about how courts would decide important questions about liability
and causation in a climate change tort action. There are also open
questions about other jurisdictional defenses, like the political
question doctrine and standing, that have been less tested by the
courts. While there is always uncertainty in impact litigation, there
are ready answers to many of the most important potential
objections.

144. JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: REGULATORY
PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY 46 (2015).
145. It bears mentioning that public nuisance actions against animal agriculture under
state law are probably not as available as they might be against fossil fuel companies and
other industries. That is because most states have right-to-farm laws that bar public nuisance
actions against animal feeding operations except when specific criteria are met. See, e.g.,
Honomichl v. Valley View Swine, 914 N.W.2d 223 (Iowa 2018) (rejecting constitutional
challenges to a right-to-farm law that barred a state law action alleging a public nuisance
from a hog CAFO).
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1. Merits Issues
To prove a public nuisance claim, plaintiffs would need to show
an unreasonable interference with a public right that was caused by
defendants’ activity. 146 Assuming that litigants would model a
complaint on the many climate nuisance cases against fossil fuel
companies currently wending their way through the court system, 147
the causal theory would be that private defendants’ production,
promotion, and sale of a product that defendants know contributes
to climate change causes an unreasonable interference with the
public right of plaintiffs to live in a world that is habitable.148 The
court would have to determine whether defendants’ conduct was
unreasonable by deciding whether “the gravity of the interference
with the public right outweighs the utility of the actor’s conduct”—
an inquiry which in turn involves assessments of the “value that the
law attaches to” the conduct and the “burden of avoiding the harm
placed upon members of the public.” 149
This may be an uncomfortable analysis, 150 but it is not impossible
or uncommon for courts to weigh the costs and benefits of
alternative behaviors and identify when costs are not being
internalized. 151 To some extent, producing meat has undeniable
benefits, as it is a source of calories and nutrition for consumers.
But from an economic standpoint, there comes a point at which
the harm—the significant contribution to climate change that will
wreak havoc on the planet—becomes so large and the cost of
switching to alternative, less-carbon-intensive sources of food
becomes so low that the production of meat can only be seen as an
inefficient choice and a cause of climate change. At that point, it
would be an unreasonable diminishment in social utility to allow
the producer to continue to produce the harmful product (at least
without paying for it), as the continued production creates a

146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821B(1) (AM. LAW INST., 2018).
147. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
148. Lin & Burger, supra note 7, at 85 (“If the climate change cases are litigated on the
merits, defendants likely will content they cease to exert control over their products once the
products are sold and thus should not be liable for abatement. Any interference with a
public right, they may argue, arises from the burning of fossil fuels after control has already
passed to the consumer.”).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821B cmts. a–e (AM. LAW INST., 1979).
150. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(raising, but not answering, a list of purportedly intractable questions associated with the
case).
151. See Grossman, supra note 64.
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negative externality. The economic theory behind using liability to
force firms to internalize the environmental cost that they have
externalized is “nothing extraordinary.” 152 Courts may need to rely
on experts to determine the optimal production of meat and the
degree of the negative externality that the industry has created, but
once they do, the damages in a climate nuisance suit should reflect
the excess production of meat beyond what is economically
efficient. While the scale of the remedy necessary to correct the
market failure would be significant, 153 it would not be any more
significant than it would be for courts to hold the electric utilities
liable for contributions to climate change—a prospect that many
find plausible but for the displacement barrier.
One likely response from the industry would be that consumers
are responsible for the defendants’ production because their
aggregate choices create the market for the product. 154 This is
another way of saying that the industry lacks control over the
instrumentality of the public nuisance, and hence that there is no
tortious conduct on the part of the defendants causing climatic
injury. 155 The argument would perhaps have more force were it
not for the fact that there are significant market distortions in this
field that arguably have been created by concerted industry
strategy. Like the fossil fuel industry, the animal agriculture
industry has been able to promote and sell its product well below
true cost because it does not incorporate the environmental costs
of the product and survives on significant public subsidies that the
This underpricing leads
consumer can only faintly see. 156
152. Brief for Catherine Sharkey as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 3,
City of New York v. Chevron Corp., No. 18-2188-cv (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2018).
153. For an argument that common law principles are flexible tools that can be easily
adapted to deal with the challenges of climate change, see id. at 13 (arguing that the view
that the common law “cannot be applied to climate change harms” rests on a “stultified
conception of the common law, one that is blind to modern developments fashioning
creative remedies and addressing tort liability under causal uncertainty”).
154. Lin & Burger, supra note 7 (noting that this argument has been raised in the fossil
fuel nuisance cases).
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Mark Bittman, The True Cost of a Burger, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (July 15, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/opinion/the-true-cost-of-a-burger.html
[https://perma.cc/5QE3-HJX4] (“What you pay for a cheeseburger is the price, but price
isn’t cost. It isn’t the cost to the producers or the marketers and it certainly isn’t the sum of
the costs to the world; those true costs are much greater than the price.”) (emphasis in
original); Susan Subak, Global Environmental Costs of Beef Production, 30 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 79,
80 (1999) (“Efforts are under way to seek to limit some of the distortions that have led to the
underpricing of an environmentally costly form of protein.”); Gowri Koneswaran & Danielle
Nierenberg, Global Farm Animal Production and Global Warming: Impacting and Mitigating
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consumers to overconsume meat because they do not bear the cost
of future environmental damages. Were the courts to impose
damages on the animal agriculture firms, the price of meat would
surely rise, and it is unlikely that consumers would continue to
choose to eat meat at the rate they currently do. 157
While determining liability should be possible, and while it
appears that meat producers are in fact liable under the
straightforward elements of a public nuisance claim, more difficult
questions arise when it comes to apportioning liability across the
firms in the industry and determining a workable remedy.
However, these too are manageable challenges, provided courts are
willing to be somewhat creative. As Daniel Grimm has argued,
market-share liability provides a useful mechanism for justly
determining each defendant’s causal contribution to, and liability
for, a climate-change harm. 158 This is because diverse products and
activities “combine to form a fungible cause of global warming.” 159
Under market-share liability, an individual defendant’s liability is
indexed to the percentage of the market the firm controls—i.e., if
Tyson Foods has around 33.14 percent of the market share for
chicken, 160 it will pay for 33.14 percent of the damages associated
with the excess production of chicken, whatever level that is
determined to be. This kind of calculation is increasingly possible
with climate change, where virtually any product can be given a

Climate Change, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 578, 580 (2008) (“One critical step [in mitigating
the effect of animal agriculture] is accurately pricing environmental services—natural
resources that are typically free or underpriced—leading to ‘overexploitation and
pollution.’”) (quoting STEINFELD ET AL., supra note 92, at xxiii).
157. In fact, in function if not in form, damages in a public nuisance case against animal
agricultural firms would be like a carbon tax, which is many economists’ preferred method
for regulating climate change, since it allows consumers to make choices about whether the
true cost is worth the benefits on an individual basis. See Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon
Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827 (2008).
158. Daniel J. Grimm, Note, Global Warming and Market Share Liability: A Proposed Model
for Allocating Tort Damages Among CO2 Producers, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 209, 211 (2007)
(“[M]arket share liability, while typically inefficient given the rarity of uniform risk markets,
provides an ideal platform for developing a liability regime capable of managing climate
change-based torts.”); see also Samantha Lawson, Note, The Conundrum of Climate Change
Causation: Using Market Share Liability to Satisfy the Identification Requirement in Native Village of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Co., 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 433 (2011).
159. Grimm, supra note 158, at 219.
160.
TSN’s Competition by Segment and its Market Share, CSIMARKET.COM,
https://csimarket.com/stocks/competitionSEG2.php?code=TSN [https://perma.cc/V5NRCPWP] (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
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carbon footprint. 161
Specific to meat, the Global Livestock
Environmental Assessment Model (“GLEAM”) produced by the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization has already
done the necessary calculations to standardize the carbon
footprints of various meat products. 162 All that a court would need
to do is determine the product category’s contribution to climatechange harms and then apportion the liability to defendant firms
based on their contributions to the market.
As to remedy, courts should have ample authority to craft relief
that avoids shuttering small businesses. To start, the meat industry
today is highly concentrated—for instance, four companies control
84 percent of the slaughter of beef 163—and this concentration
means that only a handful of firms individually contribute enough
to climate change to amount to a significant public nuisance. One
good reason to use market-share liability as a basis for apportioning
liability is to limit the exposure of smaller firms in the production
chain. Moreover, courts retain flexibility in shaping the exact form
of the remedy. While public nuisance has traditionally led to
injunctions to abate the nuisance, courts now also assess damages
in appropriate cases. 164 A court could also enjoin defendants to
satisfy the damages by purchasing emissions offsets. 165 Or it could
draw on any number of other climate change mitigation strategies
detailed in the economic and policy literature to construct a
remedial framework that gives firms flexibility to comply while
No matter the approach, if the court
minimizing costs. 166
determines that a particular firm is responsible for a certain
161. See Jason J. Czarnezki, The Future of Food Eco-Labeling: Organic, Carbon Footprint, and
Environmental Life-Cycle Analysis, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2011).
162. See GERBER ET AL., supra note 98.
163. Industrial Meat, FRONTLINE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
meat/industrial/consolidation.html [https://perma.cc/CUD3-NCXZ] (last visited Mar. 3,
2019).
164. Grossman, supra note 64, at 58.
165. See Kirsten H. Engel, Harmonizing Regulatory and Litigation Approaches to Climate
Change Mitigation: Incorporating Tradable Emissions Offsets into Common Law Remedies, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 1563 (2007). There are, of course, many practical issues surrounding emission offset
programs. See James B. Bushnell, The Economics of Carbon Offsets, in THE DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. CLIMATE POLICY 197 (Don Fullerton & Catherine Wolfram eds.,
2012); Jimena González-Ramírez, Catherine L. Kling & Adriana Valcu, An Overview of Carbon
Offsets from Agriculture, 4 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 145 (2012). However, Kirsten Engel has
argued that these difficulties are manageable for courts hearing public nuisance claims. See
Engel, supra note 165.
166. See generally JOSEPH E. ALDY ET AL., NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, DESIGNING
CLIMATE MITIGATION POLICY: WORKING PAPER 15022 (2009), https://www.nber.org/papers/
w15022.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZY86-X2K6].
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percentage of the industry’s contribution to the nuisance and
requires the firm to abate the nuisance or pay for someone else to
do it, costs would still be internalized and the price of meat would
rise to reflect the environmental damage it causes. Consumers
would be free to decide whether meat for every meal is still worth
it.
2. Jurisdictional Issues
Perhaps a more probable course is that courts would pivot from
displacement to another jurisdictional limitation to justify an earlystage dismissal before even reaching the merits. There are two
major jurisdictional limitations that have been raised by defendants
in existing suits: standing and the political question doctrine. 167
Neither should prove as problematic for plaintiffs as the
displacement analysis has been so far.
First, in order to establish subject-matter jurisdiction in federal
court, the plaintiff must have standing to sue. The test for standing
involves three prongs: (1) the plaintiff must have an injury-in-fact;
(2) that injury must be caused by, or “fairly traceable to,” the
defendants’ conduct; and (3) the injury must be “likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” 168 What is important to
recognize is that states and other sub-national government units
are not “normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal
jurisdiction.” 169 Because they have a “quasi-sovereign” right to sue
on behalf of their citizens’ health and well-being, they are entitled
167. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which limits liability for certain political activity, has
played some role in the current climate nuisance litigation. In a nutshell, the “NoerrPennington doctrine immunizes parties from [] liability if their ‘activities comprised mere
solicitation of governmental action with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws.’”
Daniel J. Davis, Comment, The Fraud Exception to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in Judicial and
Administrative Proceedings, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 325, 326 (2002) (quoting E. R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961)). The only reason this
doctrine played any role in the City of Oakland litigation is because the plaintiffs alleged that
BP and other oil companies had failed to adequately disclose in public communications—
advertising, congressional testimony, and other lobbying activities—what the companies’
own internal data were saying about the climate impacts of fossil fuel use, presumably to
make the conduct appear more tortious and less ordinary business. The plaintiffs disclaimed
reliance on that allegation when pressed by Judge Alsup. See City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c., 325
F. Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018). There is no reason, however, for plaintiffs to rely on
allegations of improper meddling with public policy. As I have argued in Part III.A, liability
stems from the knowing excess production of meat alone.
168. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016)
(quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
169. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).
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to “special solicitude”—essentially, a light touch—in the standing
inquiry. 170 Thus, although there are perhaps some questions on
each prong of the standing inquiry, courts so far have mostly held
that standing is satisfied, at least at the motion to dismiss stage.
Indeed, in American Electric Power, there were four votes for finding
that standing had been met for at least some state plaintiffs because
of their quasi-sovereign interests, and since Justice Sotomayor did
not participate, there likely would have been five votes for standing.
Justice Kennedy’s retirement and replacement by Justice
Kavanaugh makes it somewhat unclear whether the special
treatment of states in standing analysis will survive in the future.
Even if it does not, states will be able to advance plausible
arguments on each prong of the standing analysis, which should be
enough to avoid dismissal in at least some courts. 171
Much of the same can be said about the political question
doctrine. The political question doctrine requires courts to dismiss
suits insofar as they raise certain questions that would require
judges to go beyond the proper judicial role of deciding discrete
cases and controversies and to instead assume powers assigned to
the coordinate branches of the government. 172 It can be difficult to
read the signals from the courts that have opined on the political
question issues. In American Electric Power, the Second Circuit panel
held that the political question doctrine did not apply. Four
Supreme Court Justices on review of that decision agreed,
170. See Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J.
LAND RES. & ENVTL. L. 273, 284 (2007) (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520) (discussing
the quasi-sovereign interests and how they alter the traditional standing inquiry).
171. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 862–64 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating
that review of standing at the motion to dismiss stage cannot become so stringent that it
becomes a merits determination).
172. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990) (noting the purpose of the
political question doctrine as “restrain[ing] the Judiciary from inappropriate interference in
the business of the other branches of Government”). Courts apply a six-factor standard to
determine whether a political question is presented:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [(1)] a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or [(3)] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility of a court’s
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or [(5)] an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or [(6)] the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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cryptically stating that neither the political question doctrine nor
any “other threshold obstacle” bars review, although again the
departure of Justice Kennedy raises questions about whether views
have changed. The doctrine would indeed seem to have little
applicability to a non-constitutional cause of action, such as public
nuisance. For many of the reasons highlighted above, courts have
traditionally been recognized as appropriately in charge of
determining liability in tort, to the extent that it applies. 173
B. The Indirect Effects of the Litigation
Suppose for the sake of argument that there is some insuperable
barrier to a merits judgment that I have not envisioned here. Even
without a judgment directly imposing liability, climate change
litigation can have wide-ranging indirect effects that justify the
effort. 174 That is especially likely to be the case with suits targeting
animal agriculture’s impact on the environment, where there is a
policy vacuum and a lack of public appreciation for the linkages
that cause so much harm.
1. “Prodding” the Federal Government to Fill the Policy Vacuum
As Benjamin Ewing and Douglas Kysar have written, government
actors should “perform[] their official roles with a self-conscious
appreciation for the ways in which they can signal to other
institutional actors that a given problem demands attention and
action.” 175 They can use “prods and pleas” to combat “government
underreach,” much as they can use checks and balances to regulate

173. The political question doctrine might, however, be a proxy for a larger constellation
of concerns about interference with the policymaking prerogatives of the coordinate
branches. See Lin & Burger, supra note 7, at 67–68. For instance, lower courts hearing the
latest round of climate litigation have raised concerns about courts’ interference with the
complexities of international climate policymaking. In City of Oakland v. BP, one of the
recent climatic nuisance suits against oil producers, Judge Alsup dismissed the suit after he
determined that federal courts should voluntarily avoid recognizing new twists on the federal
common law of nuisance that would effectively set foreign policy. To find liability for
international conduct the court would potentially “interfere with reaching a worldwide
consensus” over climate change policy. City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017,
1026 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
174. See PEEL & OSOFSKY, supra note 144 (providing a model of the indirect effects of
climate change litigation).
175. Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of
Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 354 (2011).
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government overreach. 176 This dynamic can become even more
powerful when multiple levels of government act simultaneously. 177
The “exceptional” status of agriculture under federal
environmental law is, as J.B. Ruhl has argued, highly questionable.
Farming operations contribute significantly to the environmental
harms that other industries alone are tasked with remediating. If
public nuisance suits open the doors to liability for environmental
harms flowing from agricultural activities, history may repeat itself
and the agricultural industry may seek out preemptive federal
regulatory legislation that both protects the industry and ensures a
baseline level of control over the environmental harms that farms
create. 178 Courts’ ability to find and remedy liability can amount to
an intolerable change to the policy status quo (from the
perspective of producers of meat) which may induce coordinate
branches to take up the problem, and when they do, national
regulatory policy will be up for debate. 179
2. Encouraging and Accelerating Change in the Industry
Another major indirect effect of even the possibility of exposure
to liability is that it can spur innovation and self-regulation,
whether in an attempt to appeal to niche markets or to limit risk. 180
Indeed, the deterrence theory of torts is premised on the hope that
exposure to liability will encourage potential defendants to avoid
harms ex ante by taking adequate precautions. 181
In many ways, the potential for liability for public nuisance for
contributing to climate change through meat production would
only reinforce larger market trends that are promising to
fundamentally change the animal agriculture industry. Cellcultured meat—i.e., meat grown from stem cells in a lab—appears

176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental
Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 161 (2006).
178. See, e.g., GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900–1916 (1977) (arguing that much Progressive Era regulation was
requested by industry, as it was feeling pressure from litigation imposing liability, among
other things).
179. See PEEL & OSOFSKY, supra note 144.
180. Id. at 48 (noting that “climate change litigation can tie into the broader corporate
social responsibility movement”).
181. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019 (2001).
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to be on the verge of marketability. 182 Such meat would have an
estimated 7 to 45 percent reduction in energy use, a 78 to 96
percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, a 99 percent
reduction in land use, and an 82 to 96 percent reduction in water
use. 183 In fact, incumbent meat industry leaders have recently
begun investing in the technology. 184 Short of a shift to cellular
agriculture, there are ample opportunities for cutting emissions
from the supply chain of meat production. The United Nations’
Food and Agriculture Organization has outlined a suite of
technologies and practices that increase the efficiency of animal
agriculture. 185 Implementing them across the industry could
reduce emissions by 30 percent. 186
All these adaptations would tend to limit firms’ exposure to
liability. Consequently, one way to speed the transition would be to
heighten the incentives to avoid liability, thereby increasing the
incentives to find inefficiencies and remedy them.
3. Changing Public Perceptions and Consumer Behavior
Even a marginally successful public nuisance action against
animal agriculture—getting to the discovery stage would qualify—
might foster public awareness of and deliberation over the
significant role of animal agriculture in climate change. 187 Much
182. See Barb Stuckey, What’s Next After Plant-Based? Clean Meat Grown from Animal Cells,
FORBES (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/barbstuckey/2018/09/10/
conference-tackles-whats-next-after-plant-based-clean-meat-grown-from-animalcells/#29cbecae534c [https://perma.cc/UV5C-3MDH] (reviewing estimates that cellcultured meat could appear on the market in as little as a year, although perhaps more
realistically in 3 to 5 years). For a helpful review of the technology and its growth potential,
see Neil Stephens et al., Bringing Cultured Meat to Market: Technical, Socio-Political, and
Regulatory Challenges in Cellular Agriculture, 78 TRENDS IN FOOD SCI. & TECH. 155 (2018). For
an advocate’s view of the promise of the industry, see PAUL SHAPIRO, CLEAN MEAT: HOW
GROWING MEAT WITHOUT ANIMALS WILL REVOLUTIONIZE DINNER AND THE WORLD (2018).
183. Hanna L. Tuomisto & M. Joost Teixeria de Mattos, Environmental Impacts of Cultured
Meat Production, 45 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 6117 (2011).
184. See, e.g., Alisa Odenheimer, Tyson Foods Makes Another Investment in Lab-Grown Meat,
BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-02/u-s-food
-giant-tyson-makes-first-investment-in-israel [https://perma.cc/W6GN-NVL3] (describing
investments by Tyson and Cargill in cellular agriculture startups); Matt Ball, Mosa Meat,
Creator of First Clean Meat Burger, Raises $8.8 Million, Featured in Wall Street Journal, GOOD FOOD
INST. (July 16, 2018), https://www.gfi.org/mosa-meat-creator-of-first-clean-meat-burger-2
[https://perma.cc/G5JA-NTMS] (describing an investment by Bell Food Group, one of
Europe’s leading meat producers).
185. See GERBER ET AL., supra note 98.
186. Id. at 45–46.
187. PEEL & OSOFSKY, supra note 144, at 49–50.
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climate litigation around the world has been undertaken primarily
for its potential to ignite ground-up changes by raising public
awareness. For instance, the 2005 Inuit petition to the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights had a major impact on
changing the public dialogue on human rights and climate
change. 188
As it is, awareness of meat’s significant contribution to climate
change is dismally low. A 2014 survey by Chatham House and
Glasgow University Media Group found that only 29 percent of
respondents believed that meat and dairy production were a major
contributor to climate change compared to 64 percent for energy
production. 189 The “awareness gap” that this survey uncovered
matters for consumer demand, 190 as the same survey found that
“[c]onsumers with low awareness” were “less likely to indicate
willingness to change their behavio[]r” by reducing meat and dairy
consumption. 191 In other words, consumers who believe climate
change is a problem may be willing to adapt their eating habits to
contribute to mitigation, but many simply do not know that this is a
way they can help. Many non-governmental organizations do not
even try to influence the amount of meat people eat as a tactic for
mitigating climate change, limiting the pathways through which
Simply by
consumers might learn about the linkages. 192
crystallizing the case for curtailing meat consumption and revealing
information about the climate change impacts of agriculture
through discovery, litigation could significantly raise awareness and
change demand-side habits among consumers.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that government litigants would do well
to explore a new frontier in climate change litigation: federal
public nuisance suits against the animal agriculture industry. Not
only would exploring this frontier circumnavigate the displacement
barriers that have resulted in dismissal of most public nuisance suits
188. Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?, 7
TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 37, 41 (2018).
189. BAILEY, FROGGATT & WELLESLEY, supra note 104, at 18–19.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 19.
192. Linnea I. Laestadius et al., “We Don’t Tell People What to Do”: An Examination of the
Factors Influencing NGO Decisions to Campaign for Reduced Meat Consumption in Light of Climate
Change, 29 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 32 (2014).
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against fossil fuel producers and electric utilities, quite possibly
resulting in a merits judgment of some kind, but it would also have
the laudable indirect effect of catalyzing government, corporate,
and consumer efforts to deal with the sizeable climate change
impact of meat production. While any meaningful response to
climate change must deal with excessive and unsustainable levels of
fossil fuel energy consumption, advocates have often overlooked
the low-hanging fruit that is the highly inefficient and harmful
reliance on meat. 193 Not only are consumers in an arguably better
position to curb their own carbon footprint through changed
dietary patterns than they are to instigate structural changes in
electricity generation, but there are also gaping holes in the
regulatory approach to agriculture that have allowed the industry
to avoid simple mitigating technologies and processes. Litigation
could go a long way toward closing that gap and inspiring a wave of
change in consumer behavior with real climate impacts.
To be sure, there are many outstanding questions about how
public nuisance litigation against animal agriculture firms would
play out in a real courtroom. 194 Some environmental scholars have
expressed concern that there are too many complexities, and that
courts will always have an institutional aversion to climate
litigation. 195 In truth, though, it is the only option available for
now, and the analysis in this Article shows that, with a properly
targeted lawsuit, advocates could force the courts into the breach.

193. See Jonathan Lovvorn, Climate Change Beyond Environmentalism Part I: Forging New
Alliances in the Fight Against Climate Change, 29 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2016) (arguing that
advocates often overlook the climate impacts of meat production).
194. Zasloff, supra note 157, at 1829 (recounting such arguments).
195. See Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 135 (2011); Hsu, supra note 25. But see Sabrina McCormick et al., Science in
Litigation, the Third Branch of U.S. Climate Policy, 357 SCI. 979 (2017) (offering a somewhat
sanguine account of the advances in climate science that will make many difficulties with
litigation less pressing).

